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The United States is extremely unusual among industrial-
ized nations for its very pro-debtor bankruptcy laws. The United
States also stands alone in having a high-and rapidly increas-
ing-bankruptcy filing rate.' The number of bankruptcy filings in
the United States rose from under 400,000 per year in 1985 to
over I million in 1996,2 and filings during the first six months of
1997 were running at a rate of 1.4 million for the year.' Despite
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their helpful comments on earlier drafts and to Martha Starr-McCluer of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System for advice in using the Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances. Wendy Petropolous and Yinfang Lin provided very capable research assistance.
Research support was provided by the Law and Social Science and Economics Programs at
the National Science Foundation, under grant SBR-9617712.
For discussion of bankruptcy procedures in other countries, see Michelle J. White,
The costs of corporate bankruptcy: A U.S.-European comparison, in Jagdeep S. Bhandari
and Lawrence A. Weiss, eds, Corporate Bankruptcy: Economic and Legal Perspectives 467,
468-79 (Cambridge 1996) (comparing French, German, U.S., and U.K. bankruptcy laws);
F.H. Buckley, The American Fresh Start, 4 S Cal Interdiscip L J 67, 68-79 (1994) (com-
paring U.S. and Canadian bankruptcy laws).
2 See United States Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States
1997 549 table 856 (GPO 117th ed 1997).
s The total number of bankruptcy filings during the first six months of 1997 was ap-
proximately 702,200. See Administrative Office of the US Courts, Press Release, Bank-
ruptcy Filings Continue Climb in 3rd Quarter of Fiscal Year 1997 (Aug 15, 1997).
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the soaring bankruptcy filing rate, a federally appointed panel,
the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, recently recom-
mended changes in the bankruptcy law that would make filing
for bankruptcy even more favorable for nearly all debtors.4
This Article considers why consumer bankruptcy is so com-
mon in the United States, focusing particularly on the role of
property exemptions and how strategic behavior can make filing
for bankruptcy attractive even to high-income households. To
avoid such pathologies, this Article proposes changes to the bank-
ruptcy system that would appropriately limit the attractiveness
of the bankruptcy process. Part I briefly introduces the current
personal bankruptcy system. Part H examines the economic justi-
fication for having a personal bankruptcy procedure at all and
argues that having such a system improves economic efficiency.
However, the costs of the procedure rise more quickly than the
benefits as the amount of assets exempt from the bankruptcy
process increases. Thus, while exemptions from bankruptcy may
sometimes be appropriate, the level should not be set too high.
Part III then explores various strategies that households can use
to increase their financial benefit from bankruptcy. This Part cal-
culates the proportion of households that have a financial incen-
tive to file for bankruptcy when they use these strategies. These
calculations show that current U.S. bankruptcy laws are ma-
nipulated so easily that a majority of households can benefit fi-
nancially from bankruptcy if they plan in advance. Subject to oc-
casional judicial limitations,5 many bankruptcy exemptions are in
effect unlimited, which gives too many households an incentive to
file for bankruptcy rather than to take responsibility for repaying
their debts. Part Il also analyzes the effect of adopting the ex-
emption proposals of the National Bankruptcy Review Commis-
sion and shows that they would greatly exacerbate current prob-
lems. Finally, Part IV proposes a reform of the personal bank-
ruptcy system under which debtors in bankruptcy would be re-
quired to use both their current wealth and their future earnings
to repay debt, with appropriate exemptions for both. The pro-
posed reform would end the anomaly under the current system
whereby some debtors obtain discharge of their debts in bank-
ruptcy even though they have high incomes and, often, high
wealth. Under the proposed reform, fewer households would have
See National Bankruptcy Review Commission, 1 Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty
Years (GPO Oct 20, 1997) ("NBRC Final Report").
' See Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Limitations: A Tale of Two Solutions, 71 Am
Bankr L J 221, 229-31 (1997) (discussing two cases in which a bankruptcy judge denied
debtors the gain from their prebankruptcy planning).
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an incentive to file for bankruptcy, and debtors with a high abil-
ity to repay their debts would be deterred from filing. Households
that have low wealth and low income, however, would still benefit
from the discharge of debt in bankruptcy and receive a "fresh
start."
I. U.S. PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY LAW
The United States has two individual bankruptcy proce-
dures, Chapter 76 and Chapter 13, and debtors have the right to
choose between them.8 When debtors file for bankruptcy under ei-
ther procedure, the "automatic stay" stops creditors' attempts to
collect on unpaid debts by, among other means, garnishing the
debtor's wages or attaching the debtor's property.9
Under Chapter 7, a debtor must surrender all of his nonex-
empt assets;' ° these assets are sold and the proceeds used to pay
his debts." Secured debts such as mortgages and car loans are
paid first. 2 What is left of the assets is then used to pay unse-
cured debts, such as credit card debts, installment loans, medical
bills, and tort judgments. 3 Remaining unsecured debts are dis-
charged. 4 Debtors are not obliged to use any of their future in-
11 USC §§ 701 et seq (1994).
11 USC §§ 1301 et seq (1994).
11 USC §§ 109(a)-(b), (e), 301, 706(a) (1994). There is a third procedure, Chapter 12,
available only to family farmers. 11 USC § 109(f) (1994). Debtors sometimes file under
Chapter 7 and then quickly file under Chapter 13, a procedure often referred to as filing a
"Chapter 20." Doing so allows them to obtain discharge of most of their debts under Chap-
ter 7. But because some types of debt can only be discharged under Chapter 13, debtors
also file under Chapter 13 in order to obtain the broader discharge. In this case, they must
propose a plan to use part of their future income to repay debt, but the plan only needs to
cover those debts that cannot be discharged under Chapter 7. See David G. Epstein, Steve
H. Nickles, and James J. White, Bankruptcy 51-52 (West 2d ed 1993), for a discussion of
the Chapter 20 strategy. See Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, Cases, Problems,
and Materials on Bankruptcy 1131-36 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1990), for a comparison of
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13.
' 11 USC § 362(a) (1994).
10 Technically, all of the debtor's property, exempt or nonexempt, becomes part of the
bankruptcy estate and must be turned over to the bankruptcy court, 11 USC § 541(a)
(1994), with very limited exemptions provided in 11 USC § 541(b) (1994). Exempt property
is then returned to the debtor. 11 USC § 522(b)-(c) (1994).
i 11 USC § 704(1).
12 No single provision of the Bankruptcy Code specifies that secured creditors receive
priority up to the value of their collateral, although it is widely understood. See Theodore
Eisenberg, Bankruptcy and Debtor-Creditor Law, Cases and Materials 583 (Foundation 2d
ed 1988). 11 USC § 725 authorizes disposition of property to secured creditors. The legisla-
tive history of this provision states in part: "The section is in lieu of a section that would
direct a certain distribution to secured creditors." HR Rep No 95-595, 95th Cong, 1st Sess
382-83 (1977), reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 5963, 6338-39.
'3 The distribution of assets is governed by 11 USC § 726.
11 USC § 727(a). A few narrow classes of debt are not dischargeable. 11 USC § 523(a)
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come to repay debts, regardless of how much they earn. About 70
percent of all bankruptcy filings occur under Chapter 7.15
Although bankruptcy procedures are uniform across the
United States, the federal bankruptcy law allows individual
states to set their own bankruptcy exemption levels.'" States usu-
ally have separate exemption levels for equity in owner occupied
principal residences ("homesteads"), equity in vehicles, personal
property, and retirement accounts. The homestead exemption is
nearly always the largest dollar amount. Appendix 1 dpescribes
the exemption levels in 1992 for each of the fifty states. 17 Exemp-
tion levels vary widely among the states. As of 1992, seven states,
including Texas and Florida, had unlimited homestead exemp-
tions, but twenty states had homestead exemptions of $7,500 or
(1994). Debtors who have received a discharge of debts under Chapter 7 are barred from
receiving another such discharge for six years. 11 USC § 727(aX8).
In 1984, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to allow bankruptcy judges to dis-
miss Chapter 7 personal bankruptcy filings involving primarily consumer debts if the dis-
charge of debt would be a "substantial abuse" of Chapter 7. Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Title III § 312, Pub L No 98-353, 98 Stat 355, codified at 11
USC § 707(b) (1994). Although Section 707(b) can be read as a means of preventing debt-
ors with high incomes from obtaining a discharge under Chapter 7, several factors have
prevented it from consistently serving this role. First, some courts have taken the position
that Chapter 7 petitions cannot be dismissed based solely on a debtor's ability to repay,
and have allowed dismissal only when other sorts of abuse are present, such as criminal
activity or the use of Chapter 7 to avoid provisions of a divorce agreement. See David B.
Harrison, Bankruptcy: When Does Filing of Chapter 7 Petition Constitute "Substantial
Abuse"Authorizing Dismissal of Petition under 11 USCS § 707(b), 122 ALR Fed 141, 156-
57 (1994). Second, the statute itself provides: "There shall be a presumption in favor of
granting the relief requested by the debtor." 11 USC § 707(b). Third, the provision explic-
itly denies "parties in interest" (in other words, creditors) the right to initiate motions to
dismiss bankruptcy filings based on substantial abuse. Only the United States Trustee,
see 11 USC § 307 (1994), or the judge presiding over the action may move for a Section
707(b) dismissal. See Wayne R. Wells, Janell M. Kurtz, and Robert J. Calhoun, The Im-
plementation of Bankruptcy Code Section 707(b): The Law and the Reality, 39 Cleve St L
Rev 15, 19 (1991) (surveying bankruptcy courts and finding that few of them had pro-
grams in place to screen Chapter 7 filings for substantial abuse). Thus in practice, Section
707(b) has not consistently limited a debtor's right to file under Chapter 7 even if she has
a high income level. See Buckley, 4 S Cal Interdiscip L J at 69 (cited in note 1) (discussing
the legislative history of Section 707(b)); Karen Gross, Preserving a Fresh Start for the In-
dividual Debtor: The Case for Narrow Construction of the Consumer Credit Amendments,
135 U Pa L Rev 59, 73-85 (1986) (same).
" See United States Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States
1994 549 table 850 (GPO 114th ed 1994).
" 11 USC § 522(b).
Exemptions for 1992 are shown because the analysis of bankruptcy law in Parts III
and IV below uses data for 1992. Some additional characteristics of state exemption rules,
such as whether exemptions differ according to whether the debtor is a household head,
are not shown in Appendix 1, but are used in the calculations below. California has two
exemption systems and debtors are allowed to choose between them. Only one of the two
systems is shown. Data in Appendix I are derived in part from Stephen Elias, Albin Ren-
auer, and Robin Leonard, How to File for Bankruptcy appendix I (Nolo 4th ed 1993).
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less for single filers. There is also a separate federal exemption,
and fifteen states allow debtors who have filed for bankruptcy to
choose between their state's exemption and the federal exemp-
tion. The federal homestead exemption as of 1992 was $7,500 for
individuals and $15,000 for married couples." Most states also
exempt the cash value of life insurance, debtors' furniture and
clothing, and miscellaneous other assets. Because few debtors
have nonexempt assets, more than 90 percent of Chapter 7 cases
involve no repayment at all, and the average repayment rate in
Chapter 7 cases is less than 3 percent. 9
The state and federal exemptions do not, by themselves, give
debtors an incentive to file for bankruptcy. Suppose a debtor is
considering whether to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 or to
remain out of bankruptcy. If the debtor remains outside of bank-
ruptcy, creditors can continue their debt collection efforts, in-
cluding garnishing the debtor's wages and attaching the debtor's
property. However, garnishment is limited by states' wage ex-
emptions,20 and attachment of property is limited by states' prop-
erty exemptions.2' If, instead, the debtor files for bankruptcy un-
der Chapter 7, then creditors' debt collection efforts must termi-
nate-no garnishment of wages or attachment of property is al-
lowed.' The exemption for property in bankruptcy is either the
same state exemption that applies outside of bankruptcy or the
federal bankruptcy exemption.' Thus, by themselves, state bank-
ruptcy exemptions do not give debtors an incentive to file for
bankruptcy, because they are equally available outside of bank-
ruptcy. Filing for bankruptcy yields an exemption advantage only
in states that have relatively low exemptions and that allow
S 11 USC § 522(dXl) (1994). Congress doubled the exemption levels in the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, Title I § 108(d), Pub L No 103-394, 108 Stat 4106, 4111-12, codified at
11 USC § 522(dX5) (1994).
" See Michael J. Herbert and Domenic E. Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond, Vir-
ginia, 22 U Richmond L Rev 303, 311, 315-16 (1988) (finding that in Richmond, Virginia,
only 3.2 percent of unsecured claims were paid); Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy
Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: An Economic Analysis, 63 Ind L J 1, 38-39 (1987-88)
(finding that only 0.3 percent of priority claims and 3 percent of unsecured claims received
payment).
Garnishment also is limited by a mandatory federal exemption equal to thirty times
the federal minimum hourly wage per week, or 75 percent of net earnings, whichever is
greater. 15 USC § 1673(a) (1994).
2 These property exemptions apply outside of bankruptcy as well as within. Thus if an
unsecured creditor attaches a debtor's house, the mortgage holder(s) is paid off first, and
then the debtor receives an amount up to the state's homestead exemption. The unsecured
creditor is paid only from what remains, if anything.
11 USC § 362(a).
= The federal exemption is available only in states that have not "opted out." 11 USC
§ 522(bXl).
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debtors in bankruptcy to choose the more generous federal ex-
emption.
However, while filing for bankruptcy generally yields no ad-
vantage in terms of the amount of property exempted, the pack-
age of other benefits available in bankruptcy-especially the
automatic stay and the discharge of debts-makes bankruptcy at-
tractive.' Because all aspects of the bankruptcy package other
than the property exemption are uniform across states, the incen-
tive to file for bankruptcy is stronger for debtors who live in
states that have more generous property exemptions. For exam-
ple, suppose there are two debtors, both of whom have the same
wages, unsecured debts of $25,000, and $10,000 in a bank ac-
count. Neither debtor owns a house. Creditors are regularly har-
assing both debtors with threatening telephone calls and have
begun garnishing their wages. Suppose one debtor lives in a
northern state that has no personal property exemption, while
the other lives in a southern state that has a personal property
exemption of $15,000. Both states allow creditors to garnish 25
percent of debtors' wages. If the debtor who lives in the northern
state files for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, the telephone calls
from creditors and the garnishment of her wages will end, but she
will have to turn over her entire bank account to the bankruptcy
trustee for distribution to creditors. If she instead avoids bank-
ruptcy, the threatening phone calls and the wage garnishment
will continue, and she may still eventually lose her bank account
to creditors. Whether she gains from filing for bankruptcy de-
pends on how high her wages are and on her prediction of
whether creditors will find her bank account. Now consider the
debtor who lives in the southern state. If she files for bankruptcy,
then not only would the telephone calls from creditors and the
wage garnishment end, but in addition, she would keep her entire
bank account. Alternatively, if she avoids bankruptcy, her bank
account would still be exempt, but her wages would continue to
be garnished and she would continue to receive the threatening
telephone calls. Thus, bankruptcy is a win-win situation for the
southerner. Because of her state's generous personal property ex-
emption, filing for bankruptcy allows her simultaneously to avoid
wage garnishment and the collection efforts and to protect her
bank account. By contrast, because of her state's lack of a per-
Another advantage of filing for bankruptcy is that once they file, debtors who have
converted assets from useful nonexempt forms to less useful exempt forms can undo the
conversion and therefore use the assets more efficiently. Outside of bankruptcy, assets
must remain in the less useful exempt form because, otherwise, creditors could attach
them. I am grateful to Ted Eisenberg for pointing this out.
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sonal property exemption, the northerner is only able to stop gar-
nishment and the collection efforts at the price of "losing" her
bank account to the trustee.'
On the cost side, debtors who file for bankruptcy must pay
the bankruptcy court filing fee 6 and the cost of legal advice. They
also must bear the possible costs of losing access to credit in the
future and incurring the disapproval of friends and relatives for
having failed to meet their obligation to repay.
The other bankruptcy procedure for individuals is Chapter
13, intended for debtors with regular incomes. Under Chapter 13,
debtors keep all of their assets, but propose a plan to repay part
of their debts from future income over three to five years.' Debt-
ors' repayment plans must pay unsecured creditors no less than
what they would have received if the debtor had filed under
Chapter 7.' Only the bankruptcy judge must confirm the plan;
unsecured creditors cannot prevent Chapter 13 plans from being
adopted.2 If the trustee or an unsecured creditor who is not being
paid in full under a repayment plan objects to confirmation, then
all of the debtor's disposable income must be used for repay-
ment.30 However, creditors rarely object to Chapter 13 plans. It is
costly for them to make a court appearance, and they rarely have
a sufficient financial stake to make it worthwhile.
Because debtors have the right to choose between Chapters 7
and 13,," their willingness to select Chapter 13 (and thus be
forced to repay some debts with future income) is determined by
the value of the nonexempt assets that they would lose if they
filed under Chapter 7. For example, a debtor who has $5,000 in
nonexempt assets would only be willing to pay up to the equiva-
lent of $5,000 from future wages under a Chapter 13 repayment
plan. In contrast, a debtor with no nonexempt assets would be
willing to pay only a token amount from future wages.
See generally Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 226-28
(Harvard 1986) (discussing the "fresh start" policy).
" 28 USC § 1930 (1994).
211 USC §§ 1321-22. Plans can be no longer than three years unless the bankruptcy
judge specifically approves a longer period; the maximum period allowed is five years. 11
USC § 1322(d).
11 USC § 1325(aX4).
"Secured creditors, however, must approve the plan unless it meets certain condi-
tions. This requirement, along with other statutory requirements for confirmation of
Chapter 13 repayment plans, is specified in 11 USC § 1325.
11 USC § 1325(bX1XB).
" Creditors may file an involuntary petition to put a debtor into Chapter 7, 11 USC
§ 303(a) (1994), but the debtor may convert this to Chapter 13, 11 USC § 301 (1994). In-
voluntary petitions are unavailable for Chapter 13-this "wage earner" chapter must be
chosen by the wage earner. 11 USC § 303(a).
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Both Congress and some bankruptcy judges have demon-
strated that they would prefer for Chapter 13 to be more widely
used. Congress has attempted to make Chapter 13 more attrac-
tive to debtors by allowing certain types of debts to be discharged
under Chapter 13 but not Chapter 7,2 and by imposing no re-
striction on the frequency of filing under Chapter 13." In some
bankruptcy courts, judges encourage debtors to file under Chap-
ter 13 and to propose repayment plans that involve repaying
most or all of their debts.' Debtors often respond to these pres-
sures by defaulting on their repayment plans after a few
months." When they default, they may either modify their plans
to reduce the payments,36 convert their cases to Chapter 7,37 or
file under Chapter 13 again.
II. WHY HAVE BANKRUPTCY?
The basic economic argument for having a personal bank-
ruptcy procedure is that it provides risk-averse borrowers with
insurance against the possibility that their income or wealth
might fall before they have to repay their loans. As a result, bor-
rowers and creditors share the risk of a fall in borrowers' income
or wealth. However, the cost of having a personal bankruptcy
procedure is that it encourages some borrowers to take advantage
of the system. Their behavior makes the rest of the borrowing
population worse off. The following analysis illustrates the bene-
11 USC §§ 523(a), 1328(a) (1994).
See In re Baker, 736 F2d 481, 481 (8th Cir 1984) (holding that restrictions on re-
peated filings provided in 11 USC § 727(a) apply only to Chapter 7 proceedings). See also
HR Rep No 95-595, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 118 (1977), reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 5963,
6078-79 (advocating legislation that promotes Chapter 13 over Chapter 7).
"See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, As We
Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit in America 248-49 (Oxford 1989).
A recent survey of lawyers reports large variations across states in both the proportion of
debtors filing under Chapter 13 and the proposed repayment rates under Chapter 13 re-
payment plans. See Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many
Cultures, 67 Am Bankr L J 501, 518-21, 530-37 (1993). Another study reports that, in the
bankruptcy court in the Western District of Texas, approximately 84 percent of debtors
who filed under Chapter 13 promised to repay all of their debts. However, only 27 percent
of such debtors in the Southern District of Texas made the same claim. See Teresa A. Sul-
livan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local Legal
Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 Harv J L &
Pub Pol 801, 833 (1994).
"In a sample of Chapter 13 repayment plans, one study estimated that debtors failed
to complete two-thirds of the plans. See Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook, As We Forgive
Our Debtors at 217.
11 USC § 1329.
11 USC § 1307(a).
Theodore Eisenberg and Thomas Jackson both discuss justifications for bankruptcy
based on efficient risk bearing. See Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective,
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fits and costs of either having no bankruptcy procedure or having
alternative bankruptcy procedures that provide intermediate ver-
sus high levels of insurance.
A. Assumptions
Assume that there are two types of households, Type A and
Type B. Type A households would only file for bankruptcy if some
misfortune occurs that causes them to become financially dis-
tressed. Events such as job loss, serious illness, or divorce would
be examples.39 Type As do not "plan for" bankruptcy, and they are
assumed to be risk averse. Type B households, in contrast, plan
in advance to take advantage of the possibility of bankruptcy in
the same way that many households plan in advance to reduce
their tax liability. Type Bs are more likely to file for bankruptcy
as the financial benefit from filing increases.4"
To start with, suppose all households are Type As. Suppose
they all borrow $12,000 this period and promise to repay the debt
plus interest next period. They have no other debt. Their finan-
28 UCLA L Rev 953, 981-83 (1981) (describing the economic theory of efficient risk alloca-
tion in the context of bankruptcy law); Jackson, Logic and Limits at 228-32 (cited in note
25) (critiquing the standard economic theory). Jackson also discusses other justifications
for bankruptcy, including the fact that borrowers systematically underestimate the risk of
a fall in their wealth or income, the fact that borrowers who are forced to repay debt even
when their wealth or income is low impose costs on their families, and the fact that bor-
rowers may weight their current preferences too heavily relative to their future prefer-
ences when they borrow. Jackson, Logic and Limits at 232-48 (cited in note 25). Samuel
Rea argues that creditors are efficient insurers of income fluctuations because they are
specialists in monitoring borrowers' asset positions. Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Arm-Breaking,
Consumer Credit, and Personal Bankruptcy, 22 Econ Inq 188, 191-92 (1984). Jackson and
Rea also discuss the possibility of borrowers taking advantage of the availability of dis-
charge of debt in bankruptcy. See Jackson, Logic and Limits at 230-32 (cited in note 25);
Rea, 22 Econ Inq at 205-06. Eric Posner argues that, in the absence of bankruptcy, bor-
rowers would borrow too much because public safety net programs prevent their incomes
from falling below a set minimum level. A justification for bankruptcy is therefore that it
gives creditors an incentive to restrict lending because they, rather than the government,
bear the cost of default. Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the
Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and the Related Limitations on the Freedom to
Contract, 24 J Legal Stud 283, 307-08 (1995).
' Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook argue that most bankrupt-
cies occur for these reasons, combined with irresponsible behavior by creditors who offer
"credit far beyond any reasonable prospect of repayment." Sullivan, Warren, and West-
brook, As We Forgive Our Debtors at 332 (cited in note 34). See also Teresa A. Sullivan,
Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A
Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts 1981-1991, 68 Am Bankr L J 121, 126-40
(1994) (arguing that the financial characteristics of debtors in bankruptcy remained un-
changed between the early 1980s and the early 1990s).
' Type B households are assumed to behave according to standard economic models.
See generally Michelle J. White, Economic Versus Sociological Approaches to Legal Re-
search: The Case of Bankruptcy, 25 L & Soc Rev 685 (1991), for a discussion of the eco-
nomic versus sociological views of bankruptcy.
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cial situation this period is known with certainty, but for the next
period their financial resources (including income) are uncertain.
Specifically, they will have $60,000 with probability .95, $45,000
with probability .03, and $30,000 with probability .02. The worst
outcome might correspond to the household's main worker losing
her job, and the intermediate outcome might correspond to some-
one in the household becoming seriously ill but recovering within
a few months.
Lenders are assumed to be risk neutral and are therefore
willing to lend whenever the present value of the expected
amount that borrowers will repay covers lenders' opportunity cost
of the funds.
B. No Bankruptcy Procedure
Suppose first that there is no bankruptcy procedure, so
Household A always repays in full. Because Household A always
repays, it can borrow at an interest rate equal to lenders' oppor-
tunity cost of funds, say 4 percent. Because Household A borrows
$12,000, in the next period it will have $47,520 (= $60,000 -
($12,000 * 1.04)) with probability .95, $32,520 with probability
.03, and $17,520 with probability .02. (This is shown in Line 1 of
Table 1.) Clearly, Household A faces a great deal of uncertainty.
C. A Bankruptcy Procedure with an Exemption Level of $30,000
Suppose next that there is a bankruptcy procedure with an
exemption level of $30,000, which is approximately the median
bankruptcy exemption for the fifty states if the various exemption
categories are combined. All debtors receive this $30,000 exemp-
tion; it is not limited to certain types of property. In addition to
this general exemption, assume that there are special exemptions
such as the homestead exemption, as under current law. It is as-
sumed that Type As only qualify for the general $30,000 exemp-
tion, because they do not plan for bankruptcy and therefore will
not have made any effort to move assets into the categories quali-
fying for special exemptions.41
When the worst financial outcome occurs, Household A will
file for bankruptcy and its debt will be discharged. Because
Household A now will repay the loan only 98 percent of the time,
lenders will raise the interest rate from 4 percent to 6.12 percent,
which is now the minimum rate at which they are willing to
"This assumption is obviously imperfect, since Type As would sometimes hold assets
falling within the special exemptions even without planning. For simplicity, I assume that
this does not happen, so that Type As only get the general exemption.
[65:685
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lend.42 As a result of this higher interest rate, in the next period,
A will have $47,266 (= $60,000 - ($12,000 * 1.0612)) with prob-
ability .95, $32,266 with probability .03, and $30,000 with prob-
ability .02. (See Line 2 of Table 1.)
Introducing bankruptcy causes Household A to have much
more wealth in the worst outcome scenario and slightly less in
the intermediate and best outcome scenarios (due to the higher
interest rate), while its expected wealth remains unchanged. This
redistribution of Household A's wealth makes its financial situa-
tion less risky; because A is risk averse, it is better off." Under
the assumption that all households are Type A, the effect of in-
troducing bankruptcy is that the Type A households who experi-
ence their intermediate or best outcomes will subsidize other
Type A households who experience their worst outcomes.
Now suppose that there are both Type A and Type B house-
holds. Both types of households have the same financial situation
this period and face the same set of outcomes next period. Be-
cause Type Bs plan in advance for bankruptcy, they not only take
advantage of the general $30,000 exemption, but also are as-
sumed to convert one-third of their wealth from nonexempt to ex-
empt status"5 to take advantage of the specialized exemptions."
Thus, when the exemption level is $30,000, Type Bs file for bank-
ruptcy when either the worst or the intermediate outcome occurs.
This is because when their wealth is $45,000, they convert one-
third of it, or $15,000, to exempt status using the specialized ex-
emption. Therefore, all of their wealth is exempt in bankruptcy.
Type As, in contrast, file for bankruptcy only when the worst out-
' Because households only repay the debt with probability .98, lenders must receive a
return of 1.04/ .98 = 1.0612 (in other words, 6.12 percent interest) in order to be willing to
lend.
I The wealth in worst case is now $30,000 because A will file for bankruptcy and re-
ceive the $30,000 exemption.
" Risk averse households have declining marginal utility of wealth, so that their mar-
ginal utility of wealth is high when they have little wealth and low when they have high
wealth. Therefore, transferring a given amount from states when they have high wealth to
states when they have low wealth makes them better off.
"In addition to converting assets to exempt categories, Type B households might pur-
sue other strategies to shield property from bankruptcy. For a discussion of possible
strategies, see notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
"As an example, suppose Type As and Type Bs both experience their intermediate
outcomes. As part of their wealth, suppose both types have financial assets of $15,000 that
would not be within any specialized exemption category. The Type Bs convert the $15,000
into homestead equity by paying off part of their mortgages, but Type As do not. Because
they make this conversion, Type Bs can benefit from bankruptcy, discharging their debts
and keeping all of their assets. Because Type As do not convert the $15,000 to exempt
property, they would not benefit from bankruptcy and therefore remain liable for their
debts. The next Part discusses other strategies that have the same effect.
1998] 695
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come occurs. Because they did not "plan" for bankruptcy, they
will only take advantage of the generalized $30,000 exemption.
Suppose, conservatively, that 2 percent of households are
Type Bs and 98 percent are Type As. Suppose also that lenders
know these overall figures, but cannot identify individual house-
holds' types at the time they make loans, so that they must lend
the same amount at the same interest rate to both types. Because
the introduction of Type Bs causes the overall probability of de-
fault to rise slightly, from 2 percent to 2.06 percent (= 1 - (.98 *.
.98) - (.02 * .95)),47 lenders will raise the interest rate from 6.12
percent to 6.19 percent.48
How does the existence of Type B households affect Type As?
Line 3a of Table 1 shows that having a bankruptcy system with
an exemption level of $30,000 still raises Type As' wealth in the
worst outcome, from $17,520 to $30,000. But because the pres-
ence of Type BS causes the interest rate to rise, Type As' wealth
in the intermediate outcome is now $32,257 (= $45,000 - ($12,000
* 1.0619)), and $47,257 in the best outcome, compared to $32,266
and $47,266, respectively, when there were no Type Bs. Thus
Type As' wealth falls by $9 in both the intermediate and the best
outcomes. This cost is low relative to the benefit in the worst out-
come, so that Type As still gain overall from having bankruptcy.
Line 3b of Table 1 shows that Type Bs have $45,000 when the in-
termediate outcome occurs, because they file for bankruptcy and
all of their wealth is exempt (the $30,000 general exemption plus
the additional $15,000 that they converted to take advantage of a
specialized exemption). Type Bs' expected wealth of $46,844 ex-
ceeds Type As' expected wealth of $46,462 by $382.
D. A Bankruptcy Procedure with an Exemption Level of $45,000
Raising the bankruptcy exemption level from $30,000 to
$45,000 makes Type As better off in some ways, but worse off in
others. In this system, Type As file for bankruptcy when either
their worst or their intermediate outcome occurs, but Type Bs al-
ways file for bankruptcy.49 Because the bankruptcy system is now
Type As, which constitute 98 percent of the population, will repay 98 percent of the
time, which represents all situations in which they do not encounter the worst outcome.
Type Bs, which constitute 2 percent of the population, will only repay 95 percent of the
time, because they will file for bankruptcy whenever they encounter the worst or the in-
termediate outcome.
" Because households now only repay with probability .9794 (= 1 - .0206), lenders
must receive a return of 1.0619 (= 1.04 / .9794), or 6.19 percent interest, in order to be
willing to lend.
, Even assuming that they have wealth of $60,000, Type Bs can shelter $45,000 with
the general exemption, and will have moved the rest into protected forms.
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so favorable for Type Bs, Type As' expected wealth would in-
crease from $45,954 to $58,950-or by $12,996-if they shifted
from Type A to Type B behavior (Lines 4a and 4b of Table 1).o
Given this strong incentive, some Type As are assumed to shift
and, as a result, the proportion of Type Bs in the population is as-
sumed to rise from 2 percent to 4 percent. The probability of de-
fault therefore rises from 2.06 percent to 8.8 percent (= 1 - (.96 *
.95) - (.04 * 0))5' when the bankruptcy exemption level increases
from $30,000 to $45,000. Lenders respond by raising the interest
rate from 6.19 percent to 14 percent.52
Comparing Type As' situation when the bankruptcy exemp-
tion level is $45,000 versus $30,000 (Line 4a versus Line 3a in
Table 1), the increase in the exemption level causes Type As'
wealth to rise from $32,257 to $45,000 in the intermediate out-
come, but to fall from $47,257 to $46,320 in the best outcome.
Thus raising the exemption level in bankruptcy makes Type As
better off by insuring them in both the worst and the intermedi-
ate outcomes, rather than just in the worst outcome. However, it
makes them worse off in the best outcome, because they must pay
much higher interest rates to compensate lenders for the increase
in the number of Type Bs (adverse selection) and for the higher
default rates of both types (moral hazard). This is the basic
tradeoff in bankruptcy.
E. Implications for Determining the Optimal
Bankruptcy System
How does this tradeoff affect the characteristics of the opti-
mal bankruptcy system? The preceding analysis suggests that
there should be some exemption, but that the level should not be
too high. Table 1 allows us to compare the situation of Type A
borrowers under three different bankruptcy systems: (1) no bank-
ruptcy (Line 1); (2) a bankruptcy system with a medium exemp-
tion level (Line 3a); and (3) a bankruptcy system with a high ex-
emption level (Line 4a). When a bankruptcy system with a me-
dium exemption level is compared to a system with no bank-
ruptcy, Type A households are made better off because their fi-
' If Type As do not shift to Type B behavior when the exemption rises, their expected
wealth would fall from $46,462 to $45,954 (because of the combined effect of the increase
in the exemption and the increase in the interest rate).
"1 Type As, which now constitute 96 percent of the population, will default 5 percent of
the time-when they encounter their worst and intermediate outcomes. Type Bs, which
now constitute 4 percent of the population, will always default.
"Because households now repay with probability .912 (= 1 - .088), lenders must re-
ceive a return of 1.14 (= 1.04 / .912), or 14 percent interest, in order to be willing to lend.
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nancial situation in the worst outcome improves dramatically,
while their cost in reduced expected wealth is only $8. Raising
the bankruptcy exemption from a medium to a high level pro-
vides an additional benefit to Type As because their financial
situation in the intermediate outcome improves, but the cost is a
reduction in their expected wealth of $508. Thus the shift from no
bankruptcy to a bankruptcy system with an intermediate exemp-
tion level provides Type As with a large reduction in uncertainty
at a very small cost. However, the shift from an intermediate to a
high exemption level in bankruptcy provides Type As with a
smaller reduction in uncertainty at a much higher cost. This re-
sult suggests that there is an efficiency gain from introducing a
bankruptcy system, but there also is an efficiency loss from hav-
ing a high rather than an intermediate bankruptcy exemption
level. Although this example inevitably involves many assump-
tions, the declining benefit and rising cost of bankruptcy as the
exemption level rises is in fact quite general.'
In the example, it was assumed that households are more
likely to shift from Type A to Type B behavior when the financial
incentive to do so increases. Because Type Bs are more likely to
file for bankruptcy than Type As, households' probability of filing
for bankruptcy is therefore higher when the financial gain from
filing is greater. Several studies have tested the hypothesis that
households respond to financial incentives in making their bank-
ruptcy decisions and have found that the bankruptcy filing rate is
positively and significantly related to the generosity of states'
bankruptcy exemptions.' Assuming that households are more
If having a system of insurance that discharges debt when households' wealth turns
out to be low is economically efficient, a relevant issue is why the private market does not
provide it. If private insurers offered this type of insurance, they would presumably at-
tract many Type B households as buyers. The high default rate would force insurers to
raise premiums, causing many Type As to decide not to buy the insurance. As a result, in-
surers' only alternative may be to stop selling this type of insurance. Making this type of
insurance mandatory through the bankruptcy system does not alter the behavior of Type
Bs, but it does spread their cost over a large number of Type As, because Type A cannot
opt out of buying insurance when it is provided by the bankruptcy system. See Rea, 22
Econ Inq at 188-92 (cited in note 38), for a discussion of problems with private credit in-
surance and institutions, such as "arm-breaking" or harassment of borrowers, that would
improve the market for this type of insurance.
See White, 63 Ind L J at 45-47 (cited in note 19) (finding that the number of Chapter
7 bankruptcy filings per capita was positively and significantly related to the bankruptcy
exemption level). See also Scott Fay, Erik Hurst, and Michelle J. White, The Bankruptcy
Decision: Does Stigma Matter? 19-27 (Jan 1998) (unpublished manuscript on file with U
Chi L Rev) (using individual household data and finding that the probability that individ-
ual households will file for bankruptcy increases when their financial benefit from filing
rises, and finding that the relationship is statistically significant). However, two studies
found contrary conclusions. See F.H. Buckley and Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy
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likely to file for bankruptcy when the bankruptcy exemption level
is higher, the terms under which households borrow will also de-
pend on the bankruptcy exemption level, as the example reflects.
As the exemption level rises, risk averse households will demand
more credit because they are more fully insured against the con-
sequences of having low wealth in the future. Creditors, however,
are less willing to lend, because the probability of default is now
higher. A recent study of credit markets showed that the prob-
ability of an otherwise identical consumer being turned down for
a loan is 5.5 percentage points higher if the consumer lives in a
state with an unlimited homestead exemption, compared to a
state with a low exemption level.5 In addition, otherwise identi-
cal consumers who have not been turned down for loans would
hold an additional $16,000 in credit if they lived in a state with a
low, rather than high, bankruptcy exemption level." Thus an-
other cost of having a bankruptcy system with an excessively
high exemption level is that it reduces access to credit by all con-
sumers-not just by those who are bad risks.
To summarize, the United States bankruptcy system pro-
vides what it was intended to provide-insurance for risk averse
Type A borrowers that makes them better off when financial set-
backs occur. However, it also provides something unintended-a
subsidy from Type A to Type B borrowers who take advantage of
bankruptcy by filing even when they are not in financial distress.
The system also reduces borrowers' access to credit relative to a
Puzzle, 27 J Legal Stud 187, 204-05 (1998) (finding, in an empirical study, that bank-
ruptcy filing rates were negatively related to exemption levels); William J. Woodward and
Richard S. Woodward, Exemptions as an Incentive to Voluntary Bankruptcy:An Empirical
Study, 88 Comm L J 309, 316 (1983) (finding that bankruptcy filing rates were unrelated
to certain features of state exemptions). The latter study was flawed because it measured
the strength of the incentive to file for bankruptcy by examining whether the state's ex-
emption level was higher or the same in bankruptcy versus outside of bankruptcy. Wood-
ward and Woodward, 88 Comm L J at 313. Thus, states such as Texas were categorized as
not providing debtors with an incentive to file for bankruptcy, even though Texas has a
very generous exemption; in contrast, Connecticut was categorized as providing debtors
with a strong incentive to file for bankruptcy even though its exemption is low, because it
allows debtors in bankruptcy to use the federal exemption. Id at 319. See text accompa-
nying note 18 for a discussion of the availability of the federal exemption. The main diffi-
culty in answering the question of whether households react to financial incentives in
making their bankruptcy decisions is that, until very recently, no data on individual
households existed in which the households were asked if they had ever filed for bank-
ruptcy. For a review of the literature evaluating the proposition that debtors react to in-
centives in making their bankruptcy decisions and the models used in such evaluations,
see Note, A Reformed Model of Consumer Bankruptcy, 109 Harv L Rev 1338, 1339-53
(1996).
"Reint Gropp, John Karl Scholz, and Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy and
Credit Supply and Demand, 62 Q J Econ 217, 234 (1997).
"Id at 240-42.
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system without a bankruptcy procedure, particularly in those
states that have the highest exemption levels. Thus, while there
is a strong economic argument for having a bankruptcy system,
the gain from raising the exemption level diminishes and the
costs rise as the exemption level gets higher. The best exemption
level is greater than zero, but not too high.'
III. WHAT PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLDS WOULD BENEFIT
FROM BANKRUPTCY?
This Part analyzes the actual system of bankruptcy exemp-
tions in the United States and the incentives it gives households
both to file for bankruptcy and to shift from Type A to Type B be-
havior. When households file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7,
their immediate financial benefit is the value of debt that is dis-
charged, and their immediate cost is the value of nonexempt as-
sets, if any, that they must turn over to the bankruptcy court plus
the costs of filing. The net financial benefit of bankruptcy is the
difference between these two.5" As discussed earlier, the rules of
Chapter 7 generally determine debtors' net benefit from filing for
bankruptcy under both Chapters 7 and 13, because debtors will
not file under Chapter 13 if they would benefit more from filing
under Chapter 7.59 As a result, this analysis focuses on Chapter 7.
A. Method of Analysis
In order to calculate the proportion of households that would
benefit from bankruptcy, this analysis uses the 1992 Survey of
Consumer Finances ("SCF"), which is produced by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The SCF asks a repre-
sentative sample of 3,900 United States households detailed
questions concerning their assets and liabilities.' °
As an example of the procedure used in the calculations,
suppose a household lives in Illinois, which as of 1992 had ex-
emptions of $7,500 for homestead equity, $2,000 for personal
property, $1,200 for equity in vehicles, and an unlimited exemp-
'" This result is proved in Fay, Hurst, and White, The Bankruptcy Decision appendix
(cited in note 54).
"This calculation does not include the future costs of filing for bankruptcy, such as
the cost of reduced access to credit and the costs of bearing friends' and relatives' disap-
proval.
See text accompanying note 31.
The SCF does not ask households whether they have filed for bankruptcy. See Ar-
thur B. Kennickell and Martha Starr-McCluer, Changes in Family Finances from 1989 to
1992: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 80 Fed Reserve Bull 861 (1994), for
a discussion of the SCF and its results.
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tion for retirement accounts.61 For each household, the value of all
assets not covered by any of the Illinois exemptions is added up.
Illinois-like most states-allows married couples to double their
exemptions when both spouses file for bankruptcy, so the exemp-
tion is adjusted depending on whether the household contains a
married couple. Next it is determined whether each debt would
be discharged in bankruptcy, and the value of all debts that
would be discharged is added up. The net benefit from filing for
bankruptcy is then calculated by determining the difference be-
tween the amount of debts discharged in bankruptcy, and the
value of the nonexempt assets the household must give to the
bankruptcy court.2 Illinois does not allow debtors to choose be-
tween its exemption and the federal bankruptcy exemption. (For
states that do allow use of the federal exemption, the benefits of
filing for bankruptcy under the state and the federal exemptions
are calculated separately, and the exemption that generates the
largest benefit is used.) Because the SCF does not identify state
of residence for individual households in the data set, different
states' bankruptcy exemptions are analyzed by assuming that
each applies to the entire sample. Therefore, to fix the proportion
of households that would benefit from filing for bankruptcy under
the Illinois exemption, these calculations are repeated for each
household in the sample and then the proportion of households
that would have a positive net benefit if they filed for bankruptcy
is determined. Finally, the dollar value of the median net benefit
for those households that have a positive net benefit from bank-
ruptcy is calculated.'a
This Article reports results for eleven states and for the
United States overall. The eleven states are selected both to in-
clude the largest states and to cover a range of exemption levels.
See Appendix 1.
a The is the net financial benefit of bankruptcy, as explained in text accompanying
note 58.
' Some states increase certain bankruptcy exemptions if the individual or couple fil-
ing for bankruptcy is elderly, has dependent children, or is a renter. See, for example, 14
Me Rev Stat Ann § 4422(1) (West Supp 1997) (providing that the homestead exemption of
$12,500 is increased to $60,000 if the debtor or a dependent of the debtor is over sixty
years old or mentally or physically disabled); Va Code § 34-4 (Michie 1996) (providing for a
homestead exemption of $5,000 plus $500 for each dependent). In 1992, the federal bank-
ruptcy exemption allowed unused homestead exemption amounts to be used to shelter
nonexempt personal property, up to $3,750 for individual filers or $7,500 for married fil-
ers. 11 USC § 522(d)(5) (1994). In 1993, Congress changed these amounts to $7,500 and
$15,000 respectively, in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Title I § 108(d)(5), Pub L No
103-394, 108 Stat 4112, codified at 11 USC § 522(dX5) (1994). The calculations take ac-
count of special provisions of this type if the relevant data to determine whether the
household qualifies is given in the SCF.
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Texas and Florida both have unlimited homestead exemptions."
Massachusetts and Mississippi both have generous, but not un-
limited, homestead exemptions: $100,000 in Massachusetts, and
$75,000 for individual or $150,000 for married filers in Missis-
sippi.' Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and Texas allow
their residents to choose between the state and the federal bank-
ruptcy exemptions. Ohio and Louisiana are both low exemption
states."
B. Base Case Results
Column 1 of Table 2 gives the proportion of households that
would benefit financially if they filed for bankruptcy under each
of the eleven states' bankruptcy exemptions and for the United
States overall." If all households in the sample were subject to
the Michigan bankruptcy exemption, then the proportion that
would benefit financially from filing for bankruptcy is .14. The
lowest and highest figures are for the Louisiana and Texas ex-
emptions-.10 and .32, respectively-and the overall figure for
the United States is .17. In general, the more generous the state's
bankruptcy exemptions, the higher the proportion of households
that would benefit financially from bankruptcy.
In Column 2, the calculations are repeated but a figure rep-
resenting the out-of-pocket cost of filing for bankruptcy is sub-
tracted from the net financial benefit of bankruptcy for each
household. The cost of filing is assumed to be $350, of which $150
is the bankruptcy court filing fee and $200 represents a minimum
figure for the cost of legal advice.69 The results show that when
the costs of filing for bankruptcy are taken into account, the over-
all proportion of households that would benefit financially from
bankruptcy drops from .17 to .15, or about two percentage points.
See Tex Prop Code Ann § 41.001(a) (Vernon 1984 & Supp 1995); Fla Const, Art 10, §
4(a)(1); Fla Stat Ann I § 222.01 (West 1989).
, Mass Ann Laws ch 188, § 1 (Michie/Law Co-op Supp 1994).
Miss Code § 85-3-21 (1991).
See Appendix 1 for the exemptions of all fifty states.
The figures for the United States overall are calculated based on the results for the
eleven representative states, using actual population weights.
6 Bankruptcy filing fees are set forth in 28 USC § 1930 (1994), and the accompanying
Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees. The figure for legal advice is based on bankruptcy
lawyers' advertisements. Denise M. Topolnicki and Elizabeth M. Macdonald, The Bank-
ruptcy Bonanza, Money 82, 85 (Aug 1993) (discussing a bankruptcy lawyer who advertises
a "Bankruptcy Express" service for $350). Advertisements by bankruptcy lawyers also
were observed in the Chicago subway proclaiming "Get out from under your debts!" and
giving the figure of $200 for legal costs. This probably represents the cost of the lawyer
filling out the bankruptcy court forms and advising debtors how to represent themselves
in bankruptcy.
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Table 3 gives the median dollar benefit of filing for bank-
ruptcy for those households that have a positive net benefit of
filing. All dollar figures are in 1992 dollars. The median figures
do not vary greatly across states. The range is from $1,400 in
New York to $1,950 in Florida, with an overall median for the
United States of $1,650. These figures understate the benefit of
filing for bankruptcy, both because they are in 1992 dollars and
because when households actually file for bankruptcy, they
probably understate the value of their assets, which reduces the
calculated benefit figures.
C. Strategic Behavior
Part H assumed that Type B households planned in advance
for bankruptcy and followed strategies that would increase their
financial benefit if they filed. How is this done in practice? One
method, discussed above,70 is to shift assets from nonexempt to
exempt categories. Because the homestead exemption is usually
the largest bankruptcy exemption, debtors often can increase
their financial benefit by selling nonexempt assets such as finan-
cial accounts and vacation homes and using the proceeds to re-
duce the mortgages on their principal residences. Call this
"Strategy I." Column 3 of Table 2 gives the proportion of house-
holds that would benefit from bankruptcy after following Strat-
egy I if doing so would be beneficial. The largest increases rela-
tive to the base case occur in states that have high or unlimited
homestead exemptions. In Texas, the proportion of households
that would benefit from bankruptcy rises from .32 in the base
case to .36 when households follow Strategy I. For the United
States overall, the increase is from .17 to .20.
Even if debtors paid off their mortgages completely, some of
them still would have nonexempt property and home equity less
than the homestead exemption. These debtors can benefit further
by using their nonexempt assets to pay for improvements to their
principal residences71 or by buying and moving to more valuable
principal residences in the same state. Under "Strategy II," debt-
ors are assumed to sell nonexempt assets until they exhaust
these assets or have used up their homestead exemptions. Col-
umn 4 of Table 2 shows that, using Strategy H, the proportion of
70 See notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
7' See Alan N. Resnick, Prudent Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Nonex-
empt Assets to Purchase or Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 85 Comm
L J 238, 245-47 (1980) (discussing cases in which the debtor improved his home, made
mortgage payments, or invested in exempted assets while preparing to file for bankruptcy
and the courts found that the investments in the property were exempt).
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households that benefit from bankruptcy under the Texas exemp-
tion is .42 and the proportion that benefit under the Mississippi
exemption is .41. For the United States overall, the figure is .24.
Another strategy involves debtors borrowing more on an un-
secured basis and using the proceeds to purchase goods for im-
mediate consumption (such as vacations and clothing) or to re-
duce their nondischargeable debt. When debtors file for bank-
ruptcy, the new debt will be discharged along with older unse-
cured debt.7' The SCF gives data on households' existing, unused
lines of credit. "Strategy Il" assumes that debtors borrow the
maximum amount on all their unsecured lines of credit before
filing for bankruptcy, but do not obtain new lines of credit and do
not engage in the other types of strategic behavior already dis-
cussed. Column 5 of Table 2 gives the results. The largest in-
crease occurs in Texas, because it has a high exemption for per-
sonal property. The proportion of households that benefit from
filing for bankruptcy under the Texas exemption rises from .32 in
the base case to .44 under Strategy III. For the United States
overall, the increase is from .17 to .24. These figures would be
even higher if they included loans obtained from new sources,
such as new credit cards.73
Households also might pursue all of these strategies simul-
taneously. Column 6 of Table 2 shows that in this case, the pro-
portion of households that would benefit financially from filing
for bankruptcy using the Texas exemption is .61, and over half
would benefit using the Mississippi exemption. The overall figure
for the United States is .34. Column 2 of Table 3 shows the me-
dian dollar benefit figures if households pursued all strategies
simultaneously. In a low exemption state such as Ohio, the me-
dian benefit figure increases from $1,585 in the base case to
$2,770, or by about 75 percent. In states with generous exemp-
tions, such as Florida, Mississippi, and Texas, the median benefit
figures increase three- to four-fold. In Texas, for example, the
The Bankruptcy Code does not allow discharge of certain cash advances or debts to
purchase luxury goods or services that were incurred less than sixty days before a Chapter
7 bankruptcy filing. 11 USC § 523(a)(2)(C). However, both types of debts can be discharged
under Chapter 13. 11 USC § 1328(a). See also Janet Novack, Debtors' Vision, Forbes 45
(June 2, 1997) (showing that even if the debt was incurred shortly before the bankruptcy
filing, bankruptcy courts routinely ignore the restrictions on discharge of debt in Chapter
7).
See Lawrence Ponoroff and F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert their As-
sets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 NYU L Rev 235,
269-92, 315-24 (1995) (discussing cases in which the courts have denied debtors the gains
from their prebankruptcy asset conversions and arguing that debtors have a right to en-
gage in these conversions).
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median benefit increases from $1,680 in the base case to $5,900
when all strategies are used.74 Finally, households might both
move to high exemption states such as Texas and pursue all of
the strategies discussed here before filing for bankruptcy. In this
case the overall proportion of households that would benefit from
bankruptcy would be .61."
There are still further strategies that Type B households
could use to increase their financial benefit from bankruptcy. One
is to transfer ownership of nonexempt assets to relatives, al-
though the transfer must be made at least one year before the
debtor files for bankruptcy.76 Another strategy is for a debtor who
receives an inheritance to arrange for the donor to put the prop-
erty into a spendthrift trust. Trust assets are exempt in bank-
ruptcy as long as state nonbankruptcy law prevents creditors
from reaching the trust." A third strategy is particularly useful
to married couples who live in states that have low homestead
exemptions. The couple can incur all its debts in the name of one
of the spouses, but hold its principal residence in the form of ten-
ancy by the entirety.78 If only one spouse files for bankruptcy, eq-
uity in the home is exempt regardless of amount.79 Some states
also have high or unlimited exemptions for retirement accounts
" The median benefit figures when all strategies are used would be higher if they
were calculated based only on households that would benefit from bankruptcy even in the
base case. They drop because they also include households that have a positive net benefit
from bankruptcy only when they use the three strategies.
' As an example, Martin Siegel, an investment banker, purchased a $3.25 million
dollar home in Florida when investors filed a civil lawsuit against him demanding $2.75
billion in damages. See Larry Rohter, Rich Debtors Finding Shelter under a Populist Flor-
ida Law, NY Times Al (July 25, 1993). If the investors won their lawsuit, Mr. Siegel pre-
sumably intended to file for bankruptcy, in which case the judgment debt would be dis-
charged, and his home would be exempt under Florida's unlimited homestead exemption.
," See 11 USC § 727(a)(2XA) (denying a discharge to a debtor who transfers property
within one year of the filing with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor). See
also 11 USC § 548 (1994) (allowing the trustee to "avoid" fraudulent transfers within one
year of filing).
11 USC § 541(cX2) (1994). Most states allow spendthrift trusts to include provisions
that prohibit creditors from attaching trust assets. See Black's Law Dictionary 1400 (West
6th ed 1990). However, debtors cannot put their own assets in trust and then claim that
the assets are exempt in bankruptcy. See Shurley v Texas Commerce Bank-Austin, 115
F3d 333, 338 (5th Cir), cert denied, 118 S Ct 444 (1997) (refusing to exempt the portion of
a spendthrift trust comprised of assets that the debtor herself contributed).
" In a tenancy by the entirety, a husband and wife hold title to the whole property
with a right of survivorship, so that upon the death of either, the other takes the whole.
Black's Law Dictionary at 1465.
11 USC § 522(bX2XB) provides that property held in the form of tenancy by the en-
tirety or joint tenancy is exempt in bankruptcy if it is exempt under applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law. Sixteen states and the District of Columbia exempt from the debts of either
spouse individually property held in a tenancy by the entirety. See Stephen Elias, Albin
Renauer, and Robin Leonard, How to File for Bankruptcy appendix I (Nolo 5th ed 1995).
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and life insurance. In these states, debtors can transfer nonex-
empt assets into retirement accounts or buy large life insurance
policies."
The Tables clearly show that the proportion of households
that would benefit financially from bankruptcy is much higher
than the proportion of households that actually file for bank-
ruptcy.8 While more than half of households could benefit from
bankruptcy if they behaved strategically, in fact only about 8 per-
cent of United States households actually filed for bankruptcy
during the entire last decade. 2
The implications of these figures for the number of house-
holds that are likely to file for bankruptcy in the future depends
on the proportion of Type A and Type B households, which the
SCF data do not allow us to identify. One extreme possibility is
that all households are Type As, in which case households would
file for bankruptcy only if they suffered some financial setback. In
this situation, the bankruptcy filing rate would tend to remain
constant unless something changes that increases the proportion
of households suffering financial setbacks, such as a rise in the
jobless rate or the divorce rate. Another possibility (admittedly
extreme) is that all households are Type Bs. In this case, we
would expect all households who would benefit financially from
bankruptcy to file eventually, although it may take several years
for all of them to learn about bankruptcy and act on the knowl-
edge. This would create a large increase in the bankruptcy filing
rate. Finally, an intermediate possibility is that the proportion of
households who shift from Type A to Type B is currently low, but
rising rapidly over time. As the bankruptcy rate rises, more
households learn firsthand about bankruptcy from friends and
relatives who have filed, or from advertisements of bankruptcy
attorneys. They may hear that bankruptcy is simple, quick, and
Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia exempt life insurance proceeds if
the policy contains a prohibition on its use to pay the beneficiary's creditors. See Elias,
Renauer, and Leonard, How to File for Bankruptcy at appendix I (cited in note 79). Forty
of the states listed in Appendix I have unlimited exemptions for retirement accounts. For
a particularly egregious example, in which a physician attempted to get a discharge after
converting $700,000 of assets to exempt insurance and annuity contracts, see Norwest
Bank Nebraska v Tveten, 848 F2d 871, 872 (8th Cir 1988).
"I Many of the households in the sample that would benefit financially from filing for
bankruptcy are not financially distressed. Most United States households have little
wealth and the wealth they do have is mainly in the form of retirement accounts and
home equity, which are often exempt in bankruptcy. Lenders therefore lend based on bor-
rowers' ability to repay from future income. If households file for bankruptcy, however,
they cannot be forced to use their future incomes to repay their debts.
' See United States Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States
1996 545 table 847 (GPO 116th ed 1996).
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favorable to debtors, and that it is easy to obtain post-bankruptcy
credit.' Many of those who hear this message will change their
previously negative attitude toward bankruptcy, causing the
stigma of bankruptcy to fade. These factors suggest that the
bankruptcy filing rate will continue to rise.'
D. Equity Effects of Bankruptcy
Not only is the bankruptcy system manipulable, it is ma-
nipulable in a distributionally troublesome way. To address dis-
tributional issues, we need a measure of households' financial
well-being or ability to pay. The sum of net wealth (total assets
minus total liabilities) plus three times annual household earn-
ings provides a good measure. This distribution of financial well-
being is then divided into deciles. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4
show the proportion of households that would benefit from filing
for bankruptcy for each of the odd-numbered deciles of the ability
to pay distribution, using the Louisiana and Texas bankruptcy
exemptions, respectively. Louisiana's exemption is used to repre-
sent a relatively low exemption, and Texas's exemption is used
because it is the most generous. The results in Columns 1 and 2
are for the base case in which households do not behave strategi-
cally. They show that under the Louisiana exemption, the propor-
tion of households that benefit from bankruptcy in the lowest
decile of the ability to pay distribution is .23. The figure drops to
.20 in the third decile, .12 in the fifth decile (the middle decile of
the distribution), .03 in the seventh decile, and .01 in the ninth
decile. Thus the proportion of households that benefit from bank-
ruptcy declines as ability to pay increases. This result is equita-
ble, because it means that households are less likely to gain from
discharge of debt in bankruptcy as their ability to repay their
debt increases. Under the more generous Texas exemption, the
proportions of households in each decile that benefit from bank-
ruptcy are much higher. Even as high as the seventh decile of the
distribution, the proportion of households that would benefit from
filing for bankruptcy in Texas is .31.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 give the median dollar benefit
A survey of recent bankrupts found that 74 percent were able to obtain credit within
a year after their bankruptcy filings. See Michael Staten, The Impact of Post-Bankruptcy
Credit on the Number of Personal Bankruptcies, Working Paper No 58, Credit Research
Center, Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University (Jan 1993).
See Kim Clark, Why So Many Americans are Going Bankrupt, Fortune 24 (Aug 4,
1997) (discussing bankruptcy in Memphis, Tennessee, which has the highest bankruptcy
filing rate of any metropolitan area in the United States). Clark characterizes Memphis as
having a "culture of bankruptcy," with little or no stigma attached to filing. Id at 25.
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figures (among households for whom the benefit is positive) by
decile for the two states. The median dollar benefit figures for
Louisiana range from $760 in the lowest decile to $4,000 in the
ninth decile, and for Texas the range is from $800 to $5,000. In
both states, well-off households would benefit more from bank-
ruptcy than poor households, because the former have more dis-
chargeable debt. But equally well-off households benefit more
from bankruptcy in Texas than in Louisiana, because the Texas
bankruptcy exemption is more generous.
Columns 5 through 8 of Table 4 give the same figures when
households use all of the strategies described in Part III.C above.
Not surprisingly, more households benefit from bankruptcy in
every decile of the distribution when they follow these strategies,
and the median dollar benefits they receive also rise. Using the
Texas exemption, the results are quite startling. In all deciles
above the lowest, more than 59 percent of households would bene-
fit from filing for bankruptcy. The median dollar benefit increases
as ability to pay rises-from $1,200 in the lowest decile to
$10,500 in the ninth decile. These results show that when house-
holds behave strategically and the bankruptcy exemption is gen-
erous, well-off households benefit far more from bankruptcy than
households with a low ability to pay.
For a household in any particular decile, the benefit of shift-
ing from nonstrategic (Type A) to strategic (Type B) behavior is
the difference between the relevant figures in Columns 3 versus 7
of Table 4 (Louisiana), or Columns 4 versus 8 (Texas). For Texas
households in the lowest decile, the incentive to shift is $400 (=
$1,200 - $800), rising to $2,630 in decile 5 and $5,500 in decile 9.
The incentives to adopt Type B behavior are similar for Louisi-
ana. Thus the higher the ability to pay, the stronger is the incen-
tive for households to shift from Type A to Type B behavior and
escape responsibility for repaying their debts.
Several conclusions can be drawn from these figures. First,
virtually any creditworthy household can benefit from filing for
bankruptcy if it plans in advance and uses strategies such as
those discussed here to increase its financial benefit. Because so
many strategies are so effective, the bankruptcy system gives too
many households an incentive to file. Second, the bankruptcy sys-
tem produces inequitable results, because well-off households get
much higher financial benefit from filing than those in true fi-
nancial distress. The higher the bankruptcy exemption level, the
more the distribution of benefit from filing for bankruptcy favors
those with higher abilities to pay. Bankruptcy therefore provides
the greatest "relief" to those in the least need. Third, the various
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strategies discussed here for increasing the financial benefit of
bankruptcy have the practical effect of making the bankruptcy
exemption nearly unlimited, because households can benefit from
bankruptcy even though they are high up in the wealth distribu-
tion. Unfortunately, as we saw in Part H, an excessively high ex-
emption level leads to inefficiencies, forcing Type A households to
subsidize Type Bs and encouraging more Type B behavior.
E. The National Bankruptcy Review Commission's
Exemption Proposals
In its recent report, the National Bankruptcy Review Com-
mission ("NBRC") proposed a new, mandatory federal bankruptcy
exemption for personal property of $20,000 for individual filers
and $40,000 for married filers. States would be allowed to adopt
homestead exemptions ranging from a minimum of $20,000 to a
maximum of $100,000. In addition, renters would be able to take
an additional exemption of $15,000 for individual filers and
$30,000 for married fliers.' These proposed exemptions are much
more favorable to debtors than the current mix of state and fed-
eral exemptions, except for the wealthiest few debtors living in
unlimited homestead exemption states such as Texas and Flor-
ida. Using the information and the results previously discussed,
we can analyze the effects of the NBRC's exemption proposals.
Suppose the NBRC's proposed exemptions for personal prop-
erty went into effect and, in addition, suppose all states adopted
homestead exemptions of $60,000-the midpoint of the allowed
range. If households did not engage in any strategic behavior, 25
percent of households would benefit from filing for bankruptcy
under the NBRC proposal-a 50 percent increase relative to the
base case result of 17 percent that we calculated using the actual
exemptions prevailing in 1992. If households engaged in all of the
strategies discussed above, then 37 percent of households would
benefit from filing for bankruptcy under the NBRC proposal,
compared to 34 percent under the actual exemptions prevailing in
1992.' Even if states did not adopt the maximum permitted
See NBRC Final Report ch 1 §§ 1.2.1-1.2.3 at 121-38 (cited in note 4).
The equity effects of the NBRC's proposed reform fall between those of the Louisi-
ana and Texas exemptions. If households do not follow any of the strategies discussed
above to increase their financial benefit from bankruptcy, the proportions of households
that would benefit from bankruptcy in the first, third, fifth, seventh, and ninth deciles of
the ability to pay distribution are .36, .47, .34, .19, and .03, respectively. If households use
all of the strategies discussed above to increase their financial benefit from bankruptcy,
then the proportions are .42, .59, .51, .35, and .08 respectively. If states were assumed to
adopt the maximum allowed homestead exemptions of $100,000 rather than $60,000, then
the equity results under the NBRC proposal would move closer to the pattern given for
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homestead exemption, the NBRC's proposed reform would sub-
stantially increase the proportion of households that would bene-
fit financially from filing for bankruptcy. It would thus compound
all of the problems of the current bankruptcy system.8 7
IV. BANKRUPTCY REFORMS
Combining the current Chapters 7 and 13 into a single per-
sonal bankruptcy procedure would solve many of the problems
discussed above. Debtors filing for bankruptcy would be obliged
to repay part or all of their debt using both wealth and future
earnings, but there would be exemptions for both. The proposed
reform is based on the principle that ability to repay debt de-
pends on both wealth and future earnings, rather than only on
wealth (as under Chapter 7) or only on future earnings (as under
Chapter 13). Under the proposal, bankruptcy would be both more
equitable and more efficient.
Although no one has previously proposed combining Chap-
ters 7 and 1 3 ," Thomas Jackson has questioned the justification
Texas in Table 4, while if states were assumed to adopt the minimum allowed homestead
exemption of $20,000, the equity results under the proposal would move closer to the pat-
tern given for Louisiana in Table 4.
' These calculations actually understate the proportion of households that would
benefit from bankruptcy under the NBRC's proposals, since the NBRC also proposed
abolishing current restrictions on discharge of student loans in bankruptcy. See NBRC
Final Report ch 1 § 1.4.5 at 207 (cited in note 4). Currently, 11 USC § 523(a)(8) prevents
discharge of debt "for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or guar-
anteed by a governmental unit." This restriction, however, does not apply to debt out-
standing for more than seven years. The calculations reported in Table 2 assume that stu-
dent loans cannot be discharged in bankruptcy.
' There have been several proposals for reform of personal bankruptcy. William T.
Vukowich, Reforming the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: An Alternative Approach, 71
Georgetown L J 1129, 1152-55 (1983), advocated reducing the federal bankruptcy exemp-
tion and making it mandatory. He argued that too few debtors file under Chapter 13 and
that reducing the Chapter 7 bankruptcy exemption would increase the number of filings
under Chapter 13. William C. Whitford, Has the Time Come to Repeal Chapter 13?, 65 Ind
L J 85, 94-104 (1989), asserted that Chapter 13 should be repealed and all personal bank-
ruptcy filings should be under Chapter 7. Whitford argued that many debtors are unable
to make an informed, self-interested choice between Chapters 7 and 13, id at 88-93, and
that even if they could, filing under Chapter 13 is rarely in debtors' interest, id at 94-104.
There have also been several reform proposals that involve making Chapter 13 mandatory
for debtors who have regular incomes and pass a test of ability to repay some fraction of
their debt from future income. Eisenberg, 28 UCLA L Rev at 986-91 (cited in note 38), dis-
cusses arguments for and against these proposals and the legislative history of congres-
sional hearings on them during the 1960s. A recent proposal is the Responsible Borrower
Protection Bankruptcy Act, introduced in the House of Representatives on September 18,
1997. HR 2500, 105th Cong, 1st Sess (Sept 18, 1997). It requires that debtors file for bank-
ruptcy under Chapter 13 if they have income equal to 75 percent of the median family in-
come for a household of the same size as the debtor's, id at Title I § 101(3)-(4), specifies a
procedure for determining net income, id at Title I § 102(1)-(3), and gives guidelines for
determining how much debtors are obliged to repay, id at Title I § 102(4). The bill also ex-
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for having a federally mandated, 100 percent exemption for post-
bankruptcy income.89 He argued that .only income below some
predetermined minimum level, rather than all income, should be
protected by bankruptcy law.' However, he also argued that, of
the various forms of wealth, earnings are most deserving of bank-
ruptcy protection because earnings are derived from human capi-
tal, and human capital is the least diversifiable of all forms of
capital. 1 Jackson's discussion suggests that under the proposed
bankruptcy reform, 100 percent of earnings below a predeter-
mined floor should be exempt and a high fraction-but less than
100 percent--of earnings above the floor should be exempt. In
fact, this is the general form of states' nonbankruptcy earnings
exemptions and of the mandatory minimum earnings exemption
specified in the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act,9 2 which
exempts the greater of 75 percent of weekly net earnings or thirty
times the federal minimum wage per week. Twenty-four states
and the District of Columbia follow the federal rule, while most of
the remaining states have higher exemptions. 3
Following this general approach, my proposed bankruptcy re-
form exempts all of debtors' post-bankruptcy earnings that are
below a minimum dollar amount from the obligation to repay
debt, but requires that debtors use a proportion of their post-
bankruptcy earnings above the minimum dollar amount to repay
debt. The repayment obligation excludes transfer payments--
such as unemployment compensation, welfare payments, and
child support-because income from transfer payments currently
is exempt from wage garnishment. 4 A difficulty arises in that the
federal earnings exemption applies to net of tax earnings, but the
SCF data used here for the calculations contain information for
tends the maximum length of Chapter 13 repayment plans from five to seven years for
debtors with higher incomes, id at Title I § 117, and contains various other provisions in-
tended to discourage bankruptcy filings.
See Jackson, Logic and Limits at 226-28 (cited in note 25).
Id at 256.
"Id at 257-58. Jackson also argued that the proportion of earnings that should be pro-
tected in bankruptcy should be greater for young people than older people, because the
proportion of wealth that consists of human capital is higher for young people. Id at 255-
56.
"15 USC § 1673(a) (1994). Note that this provision specifically does not apply in
bankruptcies under Chapter 13. See 15 USC § 1673(bX1XB) (1994).
The data on state wage exemptions are taken in part from Robin Leonard, Money
Troubles: Legal Strategies to Cope with Your Debts appendix 2 (Nolo 3d ed 1995).
" See 15 USC § 1672(a) (1994) (defining as earnings subject to garnishment only
"compensation paid or payable for personal services"). Income generated by financial as-
sets-such as interest, dividends, and capital gains-is also exempt from the requirement
to repay debt from future earnings, because the financial assets themselves must be used
to repay debt if they exceed the relevant asset exemption in bankruptcy.
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only gross-of-tax earnings. To provide for this difference, this re-
form makes 90 percent of gross earnings (rather than 75 percent
of net earnings) exempt. Also, the SCF gives earnings on a yearly
rather than a weekly basis. Therefore the federal earnings ex-
emption was converted from a weekly to a yearly format by as-
suming that the same exemption applies to fifty weeks of earn-
ings per year. Taking the hourly minimum wage figure to be
$5.00, the minimum earnings exemption is $7,500 (= 30 * 50 *
$5.00) per year. The earnings exemption in bankruptcy therefore
becomes the greater of 90 percent of gross earnings or $7,500 per
year.9 5 Because Chapter 13 repayment plans are normally for
three years, the obligation to repay is assumed to apply for three
years after the bankruptcy filing. Because the SCF gives data on
earnings only for one year, it is assumed that debtors' earnings
remain the same over the three year period of the repayment ob-
ligation.
Requiring that debtors use a fraction of their future earnings
to repay their debt is more workable than the current Chapter 13
provision, under which all of debtors' "disposable income" for
three years must be used to repay debt if unsecured creditors ob-
ject to confirmation of a repayment plan.96 The current formula is
clearly impractical. In order to determine "disposable income,"
bankruptcy judges must first verify debtors' income, and then de-
termine how much income is "not reasonably necessary to be ex-
pended.., for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a de-
pendent."9 7 This standard is not merely difficult to implement,
but doing so would be extremely inefficient, because the 100 per-
cent tax on disposable income would give debtors an incentive to
reduce their income to the point where none of it is disposable. In
contrast, the proposed approach of requiring that a fixed fraction
of future earnings be used to repay debt slightly reduces, but does
not eliminate, debtors' incentives to earn. It also would be much
easier to adminiter, because only income needs to be verified,
and this can be done using tax returns.98
In addition to providing a fractional wage exemption, this
A peculiarity of the formula used here is that yearly earnings below $7,500 are com-
pletely exempt, yearly earnings between $7,500 and $8,333 are subject to a 100 percent
repayment tax, and yearly earnings above $8,333 are subject to a 10 percent repayment
tax. This gives debtors whose earnings are in the $7,500 to $8,333 range a strong incen-
tive to reduce their work effort. A different formula or a compensating adjustment could
be developed that eliminates this feature.
11 USC § 1325(bXl)(B).
11 USC § 1325(bX2).
The proposed earnings exemption could be adjusted based on family size, so that it
would be larger for families than for single debtors.
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proposal incorporates asset exemptions. Two different reforms of
asset exemptions in bankruptcy are analyzed. Reform I involves
retaining the actual state-specific asset exemptions in bank-
ruptcy that prevailed in 1992, but will include the higher federal
exemptions that Congress enacted in 1994.' Congress doubled
the federal homestead exemption from $7,500 to $15,000 and
doubled the federal personal property exemption from $400 plus
$3,750 of any unused property exemption to $800 plus $7,500 of
any unused property exemption, with both figures doubled for
married couples who file for bankruptcy."° The earnings exemp-
tion is assumed to be the greater of 90 percent of gross earnings
or $7,500 per year for three years.' '
Under Reform H, everything remains the same except that a
uniform asset exemption in bankruptcy of $30,000 replaces the
state-specific exemptions. This asset exemption is assumed to ap-
ply to any type of property, including retirement accounts and the
cash value of life insurance, and it is not doubled for married
couples. The figure of $30,000 is chosen because it approximately
equals the average post-1994 value of the federal asset exemption
in bankruptcy for a single debtor. The main advantage of adopt-
ing a single bankruptcy exemption for most assets is that it
sharply reduces households' incentives to engage in the types of
strategic behavior discussed in the previous Parts. Households
would no longer have an incentive to convert personal property
into homestead equity or retirement funds, for example, because
the exemption itself would apply to all types of assets. Because
the process of converting assets from nonexempt to exempt cate-
gories is costly and wasteful, 2 this change would improve effi-
ciency. Similarly, households would no longer have an incentive
to move from low to high exemption states, because all states
would have the same exemption. The more types of assets that
the uniform asset exemption covered, the smaller the return from
engaging in strategic behavior would be.
As a base case for evaluating the effects of the two Reforms,
Table 5 recalculates the proportion of households that would
benefit from filing for bankruptcy under the current system, as-
suming that the federal bankruptcy exemption doubles in value.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Title I § 108, Pub L No 103-394, 108 Stat 4106,
4111-12, codified at 11 USC § 522(d) (1994).
11 USC § 522(dXl), (5).
"' See text accompanying note 95.
"For example, when debtors sell nonexempt collections or vacation homes in order to
convert them into homestead equity, they incur high transaction costs and often receive
less for the assets than the debtors' own valuations.
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The results shown in Table 5 are for the same group of eleven
states as discussed above and for the United States overall. Com-
paring the results in Column 1 of Table 5 to those in Column 1 of
Table 2, only the figures for Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jer-
sey, and Texas change, because only these states allow use of the
federal bankruptcy exemption. The doubling of the federal ex-
emption in bankruptcy raises the proportion of households that
benefit from bankruptcy from .18 to .23 in Massachusetts, .14 to
.21 in Michigan and New Jersey, and from .32 to .33 in Texas. For
the United States overall, the increase is from .17 to .185-a 9
percent increase. Column 4 of Table 5 gives the median dollar
benefit of filing when the federal exemption doubles. These fig-
ures remain nearly the same as in Column 1 of Table 3.
Now turn to the results under Reform I, shown in Columns 2
and 5 of Table 5. Requiring that households use part of their fu-
ture earnings to repay debt in bankruptcy sharply reduces the
pool of households that would benefit from filing for bankruptcy,
from .185 to .08 of all United States households. The largest re-
duction occurs in Texas, where the proportion of households that
would benefit from bankruptcy falls from .33 to .12, and in Mis-
sissippi, where the reduction is from .30 to .11. The median net
benefit also falls sharply for the United States, from $1,650 when
the federal exemption is doubled to $1,280 under Reform I. This
is because those households that previously received the largest
benefit from bankruptcy tend to have a relatively high ability to
repay and therefore are less likely to find bankruptcy worthwhile
if future wages are not fully exempt. The results suggest that
even a moderate obligation to repay debt from future earnings
substantially reduces the proportion of households that would
benefit from filing for bankruptcy.
Reform II, which substitutes a uniform asset exemption of
$30,000 for the state-specific asset exemptions in bankruptcy, is
shown in Columns 3 and 6 of Table 5. Because the results do not
vary across states, only the figure for the United States overall is
given. The proportion of households that benefit financially from
bankruptcy is similar under Reforms I and H: .08 versus .09, re-
spectively. The median dollar benefit figures are also very simi-
lar: $1,280 for the United States overall under Reform I com-
pared to $1,200 under Reform II. Although the uniform asset ex-
emption eliminates the most favorable exemptions currently in
effect, it increases the value of the bankruptcy exemption for
households in low exemption states and also allows households to
utilize the exemption more fully.
Table 6 gives the equity effects of doubling the federal bank-
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ruptcy exemption and of Reforms I and H. Again, the Louisiana
and Texas exemptions are used as illustrations. Columns 1 and 2
give the proportion of households that benefit from filing for
bankruptcy for each of the odd-numbered financial well-being
deciles, based as above on assets plus three times earnings."°
Columns 3 and 4 give the median dollar benefit figures for these
deciles when the federal exemption is doubled. The figures for
Louisiana in Columns 1 and 3 of Table 6 are the same as in Table
4, because Louisiana does not permit debtors to use the federal
bankruptcy exemption. For Texas, comparing the results in Col-
umns 2 and 4 of Table 6 with the base case (Columns 2 and 4 of
Table 4) shows that after doubling the federal exemption, a few
additional households benefit from bankruptcy in the middle
three deciles, and the median benefit figures tend to fall.
Now, using Column 5 of Table 6, compare the equity effects
of Reform I, using the Louisiana exemption, with the situation
when the federal exemption was merely doubled (Column 1 of
Table 6). While the proportion of households that benefit from
bankruptcy in the lowest decile of the ability to pay distribution
remains at .23, the proportion of households that benefit from
bankruptcy in each of the higher deciles falls, from .20 to .05 in
the third decile and from .12 to .02 in the fifth decile. Above the
fifth decile, no Louisiana households benefit from bankruptcy un-
der Reform I. For the Texas exemption, the proportion of house-
holds that benefit from bankruptcy also remains the same (.38) in
the lowest decile, but falls from .52 to .18 in the third decile and
from .47 to .09 in the fifth decile. Although a small proportion of
households in the seventh decile benefit from bankruptcy (.03), no
households in the ninth decile benefit. Reform I thus improves
equity by concentrating much more of the bankruptcy debt relief
on households in the lowest few deciles of the ability to pay dis-
tribution. Under Reform I, households that have either high
wealth or high future earnings are much less likely to benefit
from bankruptcy.
The results under Reform H are shown in Columns 9 and 10
of Table 6. Here the proportion of households that benefit from
bankruptcy in the lowest decile of the ability to pay distribution
is .38, falling to .09 in the third decile, .02 in the fifth decile, .01
in the seventh decile, and zero in the ninth decile. However, for
those households that do benefit from bankruptcy, the financial
gain from filing for bankruptcy is higher than under Reform I and
higher than under the current system with the doubled federal
" See Part III.D.
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exemption. This is because households utilize the exemption
more fully, and because renters get the same exemption as own-
ers.
Thus both Reform I and Reform II improve efficiency by re-
ducing the overall proportion of households that have an incen-
tive to file for bankruptcy, and also improve equity by reducing
the number of households that benefit financially from bank-
ruptcy despite having a high ability to repay their debts. A
striking aspect of the Reforms is that even a relatively low re-
quirement to repay debt from future income-10 percent of gross
future earnings over three years-causes a very substantial re-
duction in the proportion of households in the middle and upper
deciles of the ability to pay distribution who find it worthwhile to
file for bankruptcy. Reform II has the additional advantage of
being strategy-proof, because households cannot increase their fi-
nancial benefit from bankruptcy by using "asset shuffling"
strategies.
CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that United States bank-
ruptcy procedures can be reformed in a way that increases both
efficiency and equity. Combining Chapters 7 and 13 and reform-
ing the asset exemptions would reduce .the overall proportion of
households that benefit financially from bankruptcy, but would
accomplish this mainly by reducing the proportion of high ability
to pay households that have an incentive to file. If the Reforms
were adopted, bankruptcy still would be available to provide debt
relief to households that have low ability to pay, but it would no
longer give well-off households with high earnings and/or high
assets an incentive to file for bankruptcy. The particular exemp-
tion levels used for assets and future earnings in Reforms I and II
are obviously somewhat arbitrary. Higher or lower values of the
asset and/or earnings exemptions would increase or decrease the
proportion of households that would benefit from bankruptcy. But
even with higher exemption levels, the proposed reform of com-
bining Chapters 7 and 13 would still improve equity by concen-
trating more of the benefit from bankruptcy on the least well-off
households. The proposed reforms better align bankruptcy law
with debtors' ability to repay, and also eliminate the perverse in-
centive structure that currently allows the households with the
highest ability to repay to obtain the largest benefit from bank-
ruptcy.
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